Legal Protection for the Cross-Border Climate-Induced Population Movement in South Asia: Exploring a Durable Solution by Zaman, Sharaban Tahura
[187] 
SHARABAN TAHURA ZAMAN* 
Legal Protection for the Cross-Border Climate-
Induced Population Movement in South Asia: 
Exploring a Durable Solution 
Abstract ............................................................................................ 188 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 189 
I. The Dilemma in Labeling and Defining Climate-Induced
Populace Movement .............................................................. 191 
II. Climate-Induced Migration and Displacement in South
Asia: A Contextual Analysis ................................................. 196 
A. Context from Human Rights Violation .......................... 197 
B. Context from Regional Peace and Security ................... 200 
III. Protection Mechanism for CID/M: Analyzing the Existing
Legal Framework .................................................................. 202 
A. Legal Gaps in the International Legal Framework ........ 202 
1. International Climate Regulatory Regime: An
Inadequate Avenue to Protect CID/M Migrants ...... 203 
2. Refugee Law: Definitional Barrier ........................... 206 
3. Laws of Statelessness: Incompetent for CID/M ....... 209 
4. Human Rights Law: Limited Scope for CID/M ....... 210 
5. Migration Law: Absence of Protection .................... 215 
B. Legal Gaps in Regional Legal Protection Mechanisms
of South Asia ................................................................. 216 
C. Legal Gaps in National Protection Mechanisms and
Practices in the South Asian States ................................ 218 
D. Barriers to Developing Protection Mechanisms for
CID/M ............................................................................ 222 
* Environment Law Lecturer at Department of Law and Department of Environment
Science and Management, North South University, Bangladesh; Environmental Lawyer; 
Senior Research Fellow, Center for Climate Justice-Bangladesh (CCJ-B); Member of Legal 
Research Group (LRG), McGill University Faculty of Law. 
188 J. ENV’T LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 36, 187 
IV. Remedying the Existing Regional Protection Gap in South
Asia ....................................................................................... 226 
A. Framing a Potential Protection Framework: Key
Issues to Consider .......................................................... 227 
Conclusion ....................................................................................... 234 
ABSTRACT 
It is undeniable that South Asian cross-border climate-induced 
population movement is a reality, and State actors cannot deny, avoid, 
or sidestep this dire crisis. If the habitual home becomes uninhabitable 
and the right to life comes under existential threat with no 
alternative quality options, people are obliged to move to save their 
lives. Therefore, this Article suggests adopting a nonbinding legal 
framework in South Asia with consideration of all barriers and 
challenges, along with the note that at an international level less hope 
is left to adopt a protection mechanism for cross-border climate-
induced population movement. Although the adoption of a nonbinding 
legal framework with temporary protection status might not be as 
strong as a strict legally binding permanent protection measure, it can 
be a pragmatic opening step toward eliminating the normative gap for 
cross-border climate-induced population movement in South Asia. 
However, larger participation and consensus of South Asian States to 
act under the legal framework to protect cross-border climate-induced 
population movement entirely depends on how well the framework will 
be articulated realistically. This could be achieved with a fine balance 
between adequacy and degree of human rights–based protection 
measures; integration of security-based approaches within the rights-
based approach; incorporation of flexible and large incentives for host 
states; distribution of balanced and feasible obligations among the host 
states, states of origin, and developed countries to find a durable 
solution; integration of support and cooperation from an external 
source and international community; determination of boundaries of 
acceptable conduct; and limiting discretion and flexibility. The South 
Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can take the lead 
to implement the framework, along with the support of other 
international and intergovernmental institutions. While establishing 
the protection framework, it is fundamental to bear in mind that cross-
border climate-induced population movement is not a mechanism for 
adjustment but the last resort of survival that needs to be governed 
intensely with the tools of human rights, equity, justice, and fairness. 
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The urgency to protect cross-border climate-induced population 
movement is fierce, and we must now agree to act with collective 
efforts, spirit, and integrity. 
INTRODUCTION 
s per the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), by 2099 the average global temperature will rise 
between 1.8ºC and 4ºC.1 With high confidence, IPCC’s recent report 
reveals a more dreadful scenario.2  The report projected that between 
2030 and 2052,3 global temperature is very likely to rise by 1.5°C.4 Sea 
level rise will be 0.1 meters less at a temperature increase of 1.5°C 
compared to 2°C5 (8–13 cm by 2030 and 17–29 cm by 2050).6 Sea level 
rise will cause loss of life, biodiversity, ecosystem, land, and massive 
displacement of the human population.7 It is also anticipated that by 
2050 an estimated one billion humans will be displaced or migrated 
due to the adversarial impact of climate change.8 This figure is quite 
daunting. Moreover, according to the IPCC’s fifth assessment report,9 
the massive climate displacement and migration will take place 
in tropical areas.10 Tropical areas are already experiencing the 
phenomena, and in South Asia the scenario is acute.11 In 2018, due to 
1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON EMISSION 
SCENARIOS v (2000), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/emissions_scenarios 
-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8QY-75NT] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
2 Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ [https://perma.cc/P8GU-8Z7R] (last
visited Nov. 15, 2020) [hereinafter AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT].
3 Id. at vi.  
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 207.  
6 Debbie Hemming et al., Impacts of Mean Sea Level Rise Based on Current State-of-
the-Art Modelling, HADLEY CENTRE FOR CLIMATE PREDICTION & RSCH., EXETER 144 
(2007). 
7 AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
8 Luke Baker, More than 1 Billion People Face Displacement by 2050 – Report, 
REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/ecology-global-risks/more 
-than-1-billion-people-face-displacement-by-2050-report-idUSKBN2600K4 [https://perma
.cc/A3VY-FND2].
9 CLIMATE & DEVELOPMENT KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, THE IPCC’S FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT: WHAT’S IN IT FOR SOUTH ASIA? 2 (2014), https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2014/04/CDKN-IPCC-Whats-in-it-for-South-Asia-AR5.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8EZ-TA5D]. 
10 Id. at 18. 
11 Rafael Reuveny, Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict, 26 
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 656, 658 (2007). 
A 
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the adverse impact of climate change across South Asia, 3.3 million 
people were displaced internally and across borders.12 From this region, 
it is estimated that, by 2100, about 13 to 40 million people will be 
displaced due to climate change.13 
In South Asia, along with other socioeconomic problems, cross-
border displacement and migration resulting from climate shifts cause 
multifaceted challenges linked with environmental, human rights, 
humanitarian, and security issues.14 It also gives rise to the risk of 
violent conflict within the region15 and ultimately places the cross-
border displaced population in a marginalized and vulnerable 
condition.16 Considering these contexts, this Article aims to explore 
existing legal protection mechanisms for cross-border climate-induced 
displacement and migration in South Asia. 
Under this topic, the key question that this Article intends to explore 
is how existing South Asian legal frameworks of climate change, 
human rights, and humanitarian law address issues related to cross-
border climate-induced population movement. Analyzing this question 
might help us to understand how state actors in South Asia can better 
address human rights and regional peace and security issues related to 
climate-induced migration. This analysis can eventually suggest which 
potential regional legal framework would be effective to protect cross-
border climate-induced migration. 
To explore and examine the existing legal mechanism for the 
protection of cross-border CID/M (climate-induced displacement and 
migration), this Article relies primarily on a desk review of existing 
laws, policies, and strategic documents, complemented by experts and 
stakeholder interviews. Subsequently, the findings are qualitatively 
analyzed throughout this Article. The discussion in this Article is 
divided into four parts. Part I briefly dwells on the dilemma of labeling 
climate-induced movement. Part II analyzes human rights, regional 
peace, and the national and regional security context of South Asia 
related to cross-border climate-induced movement. Part III assesses the 
12 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL 
DISPLACEMENT 2019 34 (2019), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-report-internal 
-displacement-2019-grid-2019-0 [https://perma.cc/92BT-6P4M].
13 Vositha Wijenayake & Vidya Nathaniel, Addressing Loss and Damage and Climate
Displacement in South Asia, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK SOUTH ASIA: BLOG
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.cansouthasia.net/addressing-loss-and-damage-and-climate
-displacement-in-south-asia/#_ftn5 [https://perma.cc/AJV2-EDMS].
14 Reuveny, supra note 11, at 659.
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 668. 
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present legal framework at the global, regional, and national levels for 
the protection of cross-border climate-induced population movement. 
It showcases the prevailing legal vacuum and the barriers to developing 
a protection mechanism for the climate-induced population movement. 
Part IV highlights the key issues to consider for framing a potential 
regional protection framework for cross-border climate-induced 
population movement in South Asia. 
I 
THE DILEMMA IN LABELING AND DEFINING CLIMATE-INDUCED 
POPULACE MOVEMENT 
Those who are affected by climate-induced populace movement are 
often termed climate refugees, climate migrants, a climate-displaced 
population, environmental migrants, environmental refugees, or an 
environmentally displaced population. Choosing suitable terminology 
seems profoundly challenging here, as scholars have little to no 
agreement on choosing specific terminology for climate-induced 
populace movement. Such disagreement eventually requires defining 
the scope of climate-induced populace movement and results in a 
vague, complex, and open-ended definition. For example, in 2007, the 
International Organization for Migration stated that climate-induced 
populace movement coexists with environmental migration and termed 
such movement as environmental migration and suggested a definition 
for it.17 However, like the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, many other organizations and scholars criticized the 
definition for being too broad to be useful, especially in the legal 
context.18 Essam El-Hinnawi termed someone affected by climate-
induced populace movement as an environmental refugee.19 El-
Hinnawi’s definition was also not well accepted for being too broad 
and inconsistent with the refugee definition given by the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951.20 Similar efforts were also 
17 Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division, INT’L ORG. FOR 
MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change-0 [https://perma.cc/F2KG 
-F5T7] (last visited May 27, 2019).
18 See Christine Gibb & James Ford, Should the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change Recognize Climate Migrants? 7 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 1, 7 (2012).
19 U.N. Env’t Program, Environmental Refugees at 4, U.N. Doc. UNEP/1985 (1985),
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/121267 [https://perma.cc/6ZCY-VTHL].
20 U.N. Treaty Series, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons Vol. 189 at 152,
192 J. ENV’T LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 36, 187 
made by many other scholars21 and institutions.22 However, specific 
and agreed-upon terminology for the climate-induced populace 
movement has yet to develop. 
However, the Cancun Agreement and the Paris Agreement23 termed 
climate-induced populace movement as climate-induced displacement 
and migration.24 As per the direction of the Paris Agreement and 
paragraph forty-nine of the Decision 1/CP.21,25 in 2018, under the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, the Task 
Force on Displacement (TFD) was established. The task of TFD is to 
formulate a recommendation to “avert, minimize and address 
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”26 TFD 
addressed climate-induced populace movement as climate-induced 
“displacement” and “migration.”27 Therefore, it can be contended that 
the climate change governing regime prefers to term climate-induced 
populace movement as climate-induced displacement and migration 
(CID/M) instead of using widely used terms like climate refugee or 
environmental migrant. 
However, none of the aforementioned international instruments 
define the terminology of CID/M or explicitly spell out who or what 
type of movement should be included or excluded in this category. 
Definitional shortcomings, categorical complexity, and conceptual 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/Rev.1 (1951), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume 
%20189/volume-189-I-2545-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ASY-FHST]. 
21 See e.g., JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2012); Jean-François Durieux, Climate Change, Forced 
Migration, and International Law, 25 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 187, 188 (2013); Fanny 
Thornton, Stormy Weather: The Challenge of Climate Change and Displacement, 21 INT’L 
J. REFUGEE L. 851, 851 (2009).
22 See “Climate Refugees” Legal and Policy Responses to Environmentally Induced
Migration, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 462.422 at 10 (2011). For example, European Parliament’s 
Committee termed climate induced population movement as “environmentally induced 
displacement” with a wide-ended definition. Id. at 10.  
23 Paris Agreement, Conf. of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, at Preamble, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (2016) [hereinafter Decision 1/CP.21]. By nature, the Paris 
Agreement is a legally binding international treaty. 
24 See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conf. of the Parties on Its Sixteenth 
Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2017/Add. 1 (2010), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010 
/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTQ7-HAEB] [hereinafter Decision 1/CP.16]. The 
report is a nonbinding political decision. Decision 1/CP.21. By nature, the Paris Agreement 
is a legally binding international treaty. See Decision 1/CP.16.  
25 Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 23, ¶ 49. 
26 Task Force on Displacement: At a Glance (2019), https://unfccc.int/wim-excom/sub 
-groups/TFD.
27 Report of the Task Force on Displacement 4 (2018), https://unfccc.int/sites/default
/files/resource/2018_TFD_report_17_Sep.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP2X-KAVP].
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disagreements28 are still present. But it is also undeniable that 
negotiation attempts for a specific legally binding definition would be 
a complex and lengthy process.29 Since there is a lack of attribution 
(direct and clear linkage) among climate change, adverse weather 
events, and population movement,30 it is difficult, yet not impossible, 
to categorize population displacement or migration particularly for 
climate change. Moreover, climate change stressors are often pooled 
with factors like social, economic, or political pressure, as well as 
internal conflicts and other environmental impacts. 
However, articulating a clear and specific definition appears to be a 
much-required and needed starting point to secure effective legal 
protection for the climate-induced populace movement. A clear legal 
definition is required, not only to map who falls within the category of 
CID/M but also to articulate their rights and to formulate appropriate 
policy responses to tackle the issue.31 In defining and categorizing 
CID/M, the key elements required to be taken into consideration are as 
follows: 
1. CID/M should be considered as a separate and distinct category of
movement where displacement and migration are primarily
triggered by the adversarial impact of climate change such as
salinity intrusion, sea level rise, flooding, intensified cyclone,
and prolonged drought. The reason behind such separate
categorization is that—if population movement takes place as a
result of the adversarial impact of climate change—the
international community is required to take responsibility for it
because climate change and its adverse impacts are a result of
high-level greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from developed
countries.32 Conversely, population movement due to
environmental factors might occur by breaching substantive
international state obligation or by evading state responsibility.33
Therefore, considering different consequences and responsibilities
of developed countries, CID/M should not be kept within the
category of environmental displacement or migration and must be
identified separately.
28 Gibb & Ford, supra note 18, at 7. 
29 MCADAM, supra note 21, at 135–37.  
30 See Gibb & Ford, supra note 18, at 7. 
31 MCADAM, supra note 21, at 56. 
32 Benoît Mayer, Governing International Climate Change-Induced Migration in 
Southeast Asia, CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA 28, 43 (Lorraine Elliott ed., 2011) [hereinafter Mayer, Governing]. 
33 Andrea Laura Mackielo, Core Rules of International Environmental Law, 16 J. INT’L 
& COMPAR. L. 257, 260 (2009). 
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2. CID/M can be caused by slow-onset events. For example, sea
level rise, salinization, increased temperature, forest or land
degradation, and biodiversity loss result in gradual population
displacement or habitant migration.34 Also sudden-onset events,
like cyclone Aila that hit the coastal part of Bangladesh in 2007,
can result in a large number of population displacement.35 In
sudden-onset events, populations may suddenly realize that their
place of living is no longer habitable due to that sudden-onset
climatic event. Here, though both are climate movements, the
types of movements are separate from each other. Therefore, while
categorizing CID/M, both types of events must be taken into
consideration as they are all adverse impacts of climate change.36
3. CID/M can be forced (mostly due to sudden-onset climatic
events), planned, or voluntary (mostly due to slow-onset climatic
events), and the line between forced and voluntary movement is
very thin.37 Movement can also be internal or cross-border.
Therefore, at the time of categorizing CID/M, the primary focus
should not only be whether it was forced, planned, or voluntary or
whether the movement was internal or cross border. Rather, the
emphasis should be given on the severity of the adverse impact of
climate change that deteriorates the environment at a level that
either makes the place uninhabitable or where people’s right to
life is an existential threat.38 Consequently, to be considered as
CID/M, forced displacement or voluntary migration has to take
place due to the climate change stressors that make an individual’s
place of living uninhabitable or where the right to life is
threatened, or both.
4. Often scholars define displacement as internal forced movement
and migration as internal or cross-border movement, which is in
nature, more planned and voluntary.39 The definition given by the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998 on internally
displaced persons also includes displacement where nature of
movement was involuntary, forced, and coercive.40 However, if
34 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND LAND 28 (2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/08/4.-SPM 
_Approved_Microsite_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
35 M. Rezaul Islam and Mehedi Hasan, Climate-Induced Human Displacement: A Case 
Study of Cyclone Aila in The South-West Coastal Region of Bangladesh, 81 NAT. HAZARDS 
1051, 1051 (2016), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11069-015-2119-6#citeas. 
36 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND LAND 265–68 (2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/  (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
37 DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 314 (2017). 
38 MCADAM, supra note 21, at 56. 
39 STELLINA JOLLY & NAFEES AHMAD, CLIMATE REFUGEES IN SOUTH ASIA: 
PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES IN 
SOUTH ASIA 41–42 (Leïla Choukroune ed., 2019). 
40 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report on Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2998/53/Add.2, at Introduction (1998) [hereinafter U.N. 
Guiding Principles]. 
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we refer to the term displacement to indicate internal displacement 
only, it might not be consistent with the term internally displaced 
persons.41 To indicate internally or movement within the territory, 
the guideline uses the term internally displaced persons.42 If the 
word displaced standing alone includes movement within the 
territory, the 1998 guideline would not use the additional adjective 
internally to indicate internally displaced persons. To indicate 
internally or within the territory movement the guideline uses the 
term internally displaced persons. If the word displaced standing 
alone includes within the territory movement, the 1998 guideline 
would not use the additional adjective internally to indicate 
internally displaced persons. Therefore, it can be contended that 
when the term displacement is used as a stand-alone term, it refers 
to the internal or cross-border where movement is involuntary in 
nature.  
5. For human movement to be considered as CID/M, the individual
must prove—especially in cross-border movement—that there are
no other accessible, quality options43 and the individual
must be obliged to move to save his/her individual life. It is worth
noting that CID/M can be temporary or permanent. For permanent
displacement or migration, people must also prove there is little
possibility that the deteriorating environmental condition of their
habitual home can be restored to its previous condition—for
example, sea level rise, acute salinization, or drought have made
basic needs such as water unavailable.44
6. Therefore, considering the above factors, this Article will indicate
only those individuals whose root cause of displacement or
migration is primarily triggered by the adverse impact of climate
change that makes his/her habitual home uninhabitable or where
the right to life is an existential threat and such a situation left the
individual in a situation where the person does not have alternative
quality or viable options to save his/her life except to move.
41 See Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: A Few 
Comments on the Contribution of International Humanitarian Law 38 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 324, 467–70 (2010). 
42 See id. 
43 Matthew CM. Hill, Closing the Gap: Towards Rights-Based Protection for Climate 
Displacement in Low-Lying Small Island States, 20 N.Z.J. ENV’T L. 43, 47 (2016). 
44 CAMILLO BOANO ET AL., REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, ENVIRONMENTALLY 
DISPLACED PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING THE LINKAGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE, LIVELIHOODS AND FORCED MIGRATION 7 (2008), https://www.unicef.org 
/socialpolicy/files/Environmentally_displaces_people.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XSU-UY85]. 
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II 
CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT IN SOUTH 
ASIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
Globally, South Asia is measured as one of the most vulnerable, 
disaster-prone climate hot spot regions45 due to its geographical setting, 
hydrogeological factors, low altitude, extreme climatic inconsistency, 
overpopulation, and socioeconomic factors.46 IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report showcases many observed changes in the climatic system of 
South Asia.47 The subcontinent is experiencing a change in sea level 
rise because of the glaciers melting in the Himalayan range.48 Many 
low-lying coastal areas of South Asian states, specifically Bangladesh, 
Maldives, India, and Sri Lanka, are losing lands from permanent 
inundation.49 South Asian countries are also increasingly exposed to 
other slow- and rapid-onset disasters, which are leading to massive 
population displacement. For example, in 2009 tropical Cyclone Aila 
hit Bangladesh and India. About 2.3 million people from India50 and 
850,000 people from Bangladesh51 were displaced by this tropical 
cyclone. In 2015, an estimated 7.9 million people were displaced from 
South Asia,52 and in 2016 the estimated displacement was 3.6 million 
people.53 However, cross-border CID/M in South Asia is less54 than 
the internal CID/M, though the amount of cross-border CID/M is not 
insignificant. An estimated 3,230,025 CID/M migrants from 
Bangladesh and 810,172 CID/M migrants from Nepal are currently 
45 JOLLY & AHMAD, supra note 39, at 186. 
46 Id. at 186. 
47 CLIMATE & DEVELOPMENT KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, supra note 9. 
48 J.M. Maurer, J.M. Schaefer, S. Rupper, & A. Corley, Acceleration of Ice Loss Across 
the Himalayas over the Past 40 Years, SCIENCE ADVANCES 6 (2019), https://advances 
.sciencemag.org/content/advances/5/6/eaav7266.full.pdf. 
49 See Susmita Dasgupta, Risk of Sea-Level Rise: High Stakes for East Asia & Pacific 
Region Countries, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Mar. 9, 2018), https://blogs.worldbank.org 
/eastasiapacific/risk-of-sea-level-rise-high-stakes-for-east-asia-pacific-region-countries. 
50 JOLLY & AHMAD, supra note 39, at 34. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 35. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 36.  
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staying in India.55 Pakistan is currently hosting 2,326,275 CID/M 
migrants from Afghanistan.56 
It is undeniable that cross-border movement makes an individual 
more vulnerable than internal movement because internal CID/M is 
monitored and regulated by a state according to its national laws and 
policies. Whereas in cross-border CID/M, once someone crosses the 
border, they get excluded from their state’s jurisdiction and57 seek 
protection from other countries. Fleeing or leaving the country of origin 
makes an individual extremely vulnerable to persistent basic human 
rights violations, exploitation, violence, and discrimination. Cross-
border CID/M is also a potential threat for regional security and 
peace,58 which will be discussed in detail in the latter part of the Article. 
Considering the view above, this Article aims to examine cross-border 
CID/M in South Asia from the context of human rights violations and 
regional peace and security to explore why an effective protection 
mechanism for cross-border CID/M is needed. 
A. Context from Human Rights Violation
In South Asia, the fundamental migration corridors are between 
Nepal and India; India and Pakistan; Afghanistan and Pakistan; and 
Bangladesh and India.59 Multiple case studies on CID/M from different 
parts of South Asia reveal massive human rights violations.60 In cross-
border CID/M, human rights violations mostly happen before crossing 
the border of the state of origin, during journey/transit, and after 
55 Simrit Kaur & Harpreet Kaur, A Storm of Climate Change Migration Is Brewing in 




57 Benoît Mayer, The International Legal Challenges of Climate-Induced Migration:
Proposal for an International Legal Framework, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 357,
369 (2011) [hereinafter Mayer, International Challenges].
58 Architesh Panda, Climate Induced Migration from Bangladesh to India: Issues
and Challenges (Sept. 6, 2010) (manuscript at 16), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2186397;
see also Arpita Bhattacharyya & Michael Werz, Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict
in South Asia, CTR. AM. PROGRESS 55 (Dec. 3, 2012, 4:14 AM), https://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2012/12/03/46382/climate-change-migration
-and-conflict-in-south-asia/ [https://perma.cc/NZY3-4THR].
59 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, PROMOTING EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
OF LABOUR MIGRATION FROM SOUTH ASIA 7 (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5
/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-kathmandu/documents/publication/wcms
_326235.pdf [https://perma.cc/VFG7-66JS].
60 Id. at 14–15. 
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reaching the destination.61 Often, factors that result in 
displacement/migration are the same as those that result in human 
rights violations. For example, due to the adverse impact of climate 
change, an individual can lose their habitual residence and eventually 
become trapped in an inhumane situation where their right to life; 
access to basic needs such as food, health care, and cultural identity; 
territorial integrity; or livelihood are violated or threatened. 
While in transit, displaced or migrating individuals often live in 
perilous conditions62 that risk a range of human rights violations.63 For 
example, climate vulnerability is very high in the coastal region of 
Bangladesh,64 where displacement or migration is a very common 
phenomenon.65 Seeking better living conditions, vulnerable 
populations are often forced to or voluntarily choose cross-border 
movement and become victims of human traffickers. Such attempts for 
illegal cross-border movement often result in debt; inhuman, degrading 
treatment and captivity by traffickers; arrest and detention by the 
coastal or destination states; and high death rates due to risky migration 
routes.66 In May 2019, thirty-seven Bangladeshi illegal migrants 
drowned off the Tunisian coast.67 In transit, migrant women and 
children remain at high risk of health hazards, sexual abuse, violence, 
exploitation, and trafficking,68 resulting in gross human rights 
violations. 
Human rights violations also remain high when migrant or displaced 
persons reach their destination country due to forceful pushbacks, 
deterrent migration laws, restrictions and banning at the border, 
61 OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS., Discussion Paper: The Rights of 
Those Disproportionately Impacted by Climate Change (2016), https://www.ohchr.org 
/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/EM2016/DisproportionateImpacts.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/C9KV-T3LR] [hereinafter Discussion Paper]. 
62 Off. United Nations High Comm’r Hum. Rts., Situation of Migrants in Transit, ¶ 3, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/35, (2016) [hereinafter Situation of Migrants in Transit]. 
63 Id. ¶ 7. 
64 Nasir Uddin et al., Mapping of Climate Vulnerability of the Coastal Region of 
Bangladesh Using Principal Component Analysis, 102 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 47, 47 (2019). 
65 Id. 
66 MIXED MIGRATION CENTRE, WHAT MAKES REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS 
VULNERABLE TO DETENTION IN LIBYA? A MICRO LEVEL STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS 
OF DETENTION 1, 5–6 (2019), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/082 
_determinants_of_detention.pdf. 
67 Dhaka Tribune, 37 Bangladeshis Among 60 Migrants Reportedly Drown off Tunisia 
Coast (May 11, 2019, 9:43 PM), https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/2019/05/11/51 
-bangladeshi-migrants-drown-off-tunisia-coast.
68 Situation of Migrants in Transit, supra note 62, ¶ 49.
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dangerous interceptions, and administrative sentences. State practices 
like these do not conform to the standards and principles set by human 
rights law. Moreover, these practices make it difficult to cross the 
borders safely and result in torture, death, and human rights abuses. For 
example, to stop illegal migration in India, the Indian Border Security 
Force often uses firearms on the India-Bangladesh border even if the 
illegal migrant is unarmed.69 In the last ten years, the Indian Border 
Security Force killed 294 Bangladeshi people on the India-Bangladesh 
border,70 which is alarming. Even after crossing the border, the 
displaced person often remains in a precarious situation (especially 
women, children, persons with disabilities, people in minority 
status).71 It happens due to the deprivation, discrimination, and limited 
or no access to some basic human rights in general,72 such as lack of 
access to basic health care, education, the labor market, legal 
protection, judicial and redress mechanisms, and cultural rights.73 The 
barrier to enjoying all these rights ultimately keeps the CID/M migrants 
at a greater risk of extortion, exploitation, trafficking, abuse (especially 
gender-based and sexual abuse), discrimination, violence, forced 
deportation, and unlawful detention. For example, in 2009 when Bhola 
island was submerged due to the cyclone Aila, many displaced 
populations crossed the border and moved to India.74 These 
displaced populations have no legal protection in India and survive 
under the constant fear of deportation to their homeland, which is 
uninhabitable.75 
69 Brad Adams, India’s Shoot-to-Kill Policy on the Bangladesh Border, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Jan. 23, 2011, 10:48 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/01/23/indias-shoot 
-kill-policy-bangladesh-border [https://perma.cc/66P2-5JBP].
70 294 Bangladeshis Killed by BSF in Last 10yrs: Home Minister, THE DAILY STAR (July
11, 2019, 06:15 PM), https://www.thedailystar.net/country/294-bangladeshi-killed-by-bsf
-in-last-10-years-1769911 [https://perma.cc/VZY9-AS43].
71 Situation of Migrants in Transit, supra note 62, ¶ 29–30.
72 Id. ¶ 10. 
73 Discussion Paper, supra note 61, at 2. 
74 Jane McAdam & Ben Saul, Displacement with Dignity: International Law and Policy 
Responses to Climate Change Migration and Security in Bangladesh, 53 GER. Y.B.  
INT’L L. 243, 244 (2010), https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and 
_damage_executive_committee/application/pdf/mcadam_and_saul_gyil_2010.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WMP5-V88L]; 18 Killed as Cyclone Aila Lashes Coast, THE DAILY STAR (May 
26, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-89865 [https://perma.cc 
/2QBT-7CXB]. 
75 Bhattacharyya & Werz, supra note 58, at 34. 
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B. Context from Regional Peace and Security
Territorial borders are considered delicate issues as they are often 
linked to the independence and sovereignty of a state. Because of this, 
states remain very rigid when it comes to giving access to migrant, 
displaced populations or refugees.76 Moreover, cross-border population 
movement poses a significant threat and tension in national and 
regional peace and security. Within the South Asia region, due to a high 
level of climate-induced populace movement, there is rising tension 
between countries like India and Bangladesh; Nepal and India; 
Afghanistan and Pakistan; Maldives and Sri Lanka; India and Sri 
Lanka.77 The amount of CID/M migrants from Bangladesh and Nepal 
to India is one of the persistent geopolitical tensions in this region. 
India, in August 2019, excluded nearly 2 million people from its Assam 
citizenship list on the grounds of illegal immigration.78 Many of these 
declared illegal immigrants from Bangladesh are climate-induced 
displaced populations who lost their lands due to salinity intrusion, 
flood, or river erosion and were forced to cross the border.79 Stripping 
citizenship from such a large number of people casts clouds on 
geopolitical relationships and creates the fear of statelessness. 
States that host migrants or displaced populations are also facing 
security problems within the territory with the growing conflict 
between migrants and citizens. In Assam and West Bengal of India, the 
biggest issue of conflict is the residence of a large number of 
Bangladeshi illegal migrants.80 The situation can be better explained by 
discussing the Bodo tribe and the Muslim Bengali settlers’ conflict that 
took place in Assam in 2012. Due to climate stressors in the last few 
decades, a significant number of populations from coastal areas of 
Bangladesh migrated to Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura.81 This high 
76 Elisa Massimino & Alexandra Schmitt, A Right-Centered Paradigm for Protecting 
the Forcibly Displaced, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 7, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://www 
.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2020/12/07/493435/rights-centered-paradigm 
-protecting-forcibly-displaced/ [https://perma.cc/8YDR-9DX5].
77 See JOLLY & AHMAD, supra note 39, at 39.
78 Abusaleh Shariff, ‘National Register of Indian Citizens’ (NRIC) – Does the Assam
Experience Help Mainland States? 3 (Nov. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://www
.researchgate.net/publication/337366837_'National_Register_of_Indian_Citizens'_NRIC_-
_Does_the_Assam_Experience_help_Mainland_States_1.
79 Chandrani Sinha, Climate Refugees Stripped of Citizenship in Assam, THE
THIRD POLE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2019/11/08/climate-refugees
-stripped-of-citizenship-in-assam [https://perma.cc/5Q83-8XJZ].
80 Bhattacharyya & Werz, supra note 58, at 4–5.
81 Id. at 29. 
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flow of population movement has increased intolerance toward 
Bangladeshi migrants.82 Moreover, in Assam, Bangladeshi migrants 
have slowly taken control in forest, farming, and cultivation land 
traditionally controlled by the Bodo community.83 Gradually, 
Bangladeshi migrants have become powerful in local politics and 
started to get involved with some illegal trades like drug smuggling.84 
Bangladeshi migrants’ growing power and control over the land spread 
fear and bitterness amongst the Bodo and other tribal communities.85 
Moreover, Bodo tribe leaders asserted that Bangladeshi settlers were 
using their power to impose the Muslim religion and Bangladeshi 
culture in the area.86 All these issues stoked tension in the area and have 
resulted in several attacks by the locals on Bangladeshi settlers.87 
However, a massive outburst took place in 2012 on the issue of building 
a mosque.88 The riot started by the killing of a Bangladeshi migrant 
named Abdul Quader and lasted one week.89 Eighty people died 
(mostly Bengali migrants and some Bodos as well), and many 
Bangladeshi migrants are still missing.90 At the time of the riot, Assam 
people also made a strong demand to deport all Bangladeshi migrants. 
After the conflict, many Bangladeshi migrants were forced to leave the 
villages and had to stay in a makeshift relief camp for a long time.91 
According to Rehana Bibi (aged 63, whose son was killed in the riot), 
“We prefer to stay in these government-aided camps though we don’t 
82 Id. at 43. 
83 Arpita Bhattacharyya, Understanding the Historical Conflicts Behind Today’s 
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89 Bangladesh Opposition Leader’s Execution Sparks Deadly Riots, CBS NEWS (Dec. 
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90 S.B., Killing for a Homeland, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2012), https://www
.economist.com/banyan/2012/08/24/killing-for-a-homeland.
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get enough to eat or space to sleep. But that is better than constantly 
living with the threat of death.”92 
Many local people termed the riot as “killing for homeland.”93 The 
Bodo tribe and the Muslim Bangladeshi settlers’ conflict is a good case 
to prove the interlinkage between climate change, human mobility, and 
growing tensions and threats to national and regional peace and 
security. The conflict also showcases noteworthy gaps in the protection 
mechanism of cross-border CID/M. 
III 
PROTECTION MECHANISM FOR CID/M: 
ANALYZING THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The contextual analysis above makes it evident that an international, 
regional, and national mechanism is immediately needed to secure the 
rights of displaced or migrant people. However, besides a lack of a 
clear definition,94 there is also no single legal and normative framework 
that specifically and adequately addresses the protection issue of cross-
border CID/M at the international level. For cross-border CID/M, a 
huge protection gap paves the way to deny or condemn the rights of 
CID/M migrants by the international communities and national 
governments. Therefore, this section aims to evaluate existing legal 
gaps at the international,95 regional, and national legal frameworks to 
showcase why and how protection mechanisms for cross-border 
CID/M remains missing from any protection regimes. Solving this 
problem may lead us to adopt a new approach or to develop a new 
mechanism for protecting the rights of CID/M migrants.  
A. Legal Gaps in the International Legal Framework
At the global level, the governing regimes that are most relevant for 
CID/M are climate change, refugee, statelessness, migration, and 
human rights law.96 The discussion below evaluates why and how the 
92 Subir Bhaumik, Assam Violence Reverberates Across India, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 16, 
2012), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/201281572950685537.html 
[https://perma.cc/2TJN-JA64]. 
93 S.B., Killing for a Homeland, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2012) https://www 
.economist.com/banyan/2012/08/24/killing-for-a-homeland. 
94 BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 37, at 318. 
95 Id. 
96 JOLLY & AHMAD, supra note 39, at 79; Lauren Nishimura, ‘Climate Change 
Migrants’: Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration 
into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 107, 114 (2015). 
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protection mechanism for cross-border CID/M remains entirely 
missing in each regime. 
1. International Climate Regulatory Regime: An Inadequate Avenue
to Protect CID/M Migrants
In 1990, the report of the IPCC underscored CID/M as an adverse
impact of climate change,97 though the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 1992 (UNFCCC) does not address 
CID/M.98 In its text, there is no explicit reference to CID/M. However, 
Articles 3.2 and 4.8 recognize vulnerable developing country Parties’ 
specific needs and special circumstances resulting from the adverse 
impact of climate change.99 These articles also request that parties give 
full consideration to taking appropriate action to meet the needs and 
concerns of developing countries to address the adverse impact of 
climate change.100 Through recognizing the vulnerability of developing 
countries, the UNFCCC recognizes CID/M under a broader context 
instead of referring specifically to CID/M. The reason behind 
remaining silent on the issue of CID/M may be that the UNFCCC is 
more focused on GHG emission reduction and CID/M is primarily 
viewed as part of adaptation.101 Looking into climate-induced 
migration from the perspective of adaptation strategy can be partially 
rational. But looking at the entire picture of CID/M from an adaptation 
perspective is an oversimplification which may bypass many 
fundamental human rights of CID/M, such as the right to cultural 
practice and the right to maintain a traditional livelihood. 
However, the legal protections for CID/M have drawn huge focus at 
the UNFCCC negotiation table, specifically from the Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
Groups.102 It also draws interest from academics, scientists, NGOs, and 
their strong advocates, which was later reflected in the Cancun 
Agreement that was adopted in 2010. The Cancun Agreement contains 
the first explicit reference of CID/M in the climate-governing regime, 
97 IPCC, FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT - OVERVIEW AND POLICYMAKER SUMMARIES 1, 
55 (1992).  
98 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/Informal/84 (May 9, 1992). 
99 Id. at 4, 8–9. 
100 Id. at 8. 
101 JOLLY & AHMAD, supra note 39, at 85. 
102 BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 37, at 312, 321. 
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though unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Cancun Agreement has no 
legally binding effect.103 The Cancun Agreement acknowledges that at 
the national, regional, and global levels there is a need to “enhance 
understanding, coordination, and cooperation concerning” CID/M and 
require states to undertake “enhance[d] adaptation action.”104 However, 
the provision is not specific enough. The requirement to take enhanced 
adaptation action is a voluntary obligation that represents a mere 
political acknowledgment105 and failed to produce concrete actions.106 
Moreover, the provision did not refer to enhanced responsibility 
for developed countries under the “common but differentiate 
responsibility” principle, which was advocated by developing countries 
and strongly denied by the developed countries.107 However, the 
Cancun Agreement formally created space for CID/M at the UNFCCC 
negotiation table and was discussed in the context of adaptation, loss, 
and damage.108 
During the negotiation on the text of the Paris Agreement, 
developing countries, academics, and human rights organizations 
strongly advocated to include reference of CID/M in the Paris 
Agreement. The reference to CID/M survived until the last final draft 
text of the Paris Agreement under the loss and damage (Article 8).109 
However, the reference to CID/M was deleted from the final text due 
to strong opposition from Australia.110 Australia refused to agree on a 
mutually agreed legal status for CID/M that might create a burden for 
Australia to receive a high-volume population of migrated or displaced 
persons from a low-lying country like Tuvalu, Kiribati, or the Solomon 
Islands.111 Currently, the reference to CID/M exists only in the Paris 
Agreement’s preamble where parties are recommended to “respect, 
promote, and consider” migrants’ rights while taking action for climate 
103 Id. at 326. 
104 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on Its Sixteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at 3, 5 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
105 Nishimura, supra note 96, at 116. 
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109 Omer Karasapan, Refugees: Displaced from the Paris Climate Change Agreement?, 
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change.112 However, Article 8.4 of the Paris Agreement lists factors 
(like slow-onset events, permanent and irreversible damage) for which 
people might get displaced or be forced to migrate.113 Therefore, it 
could be argued that Article 8 covers the issue of CID/M. Article 8 
requests and recommends that parties cooperate and facilitate enhanced 
understanding, action, and support to address the listed factors.114 
Again, in nature, these provisions are all voluntary and have no legal 
effect. However, it is worth noting that several countries in their 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) referred to CID/M in an 
internal context, not cross-border (Chad, Egypt, Nigeria, Kiribati 
referred to CID/M in their respective NDCs)115 
A TFD is established under the Warsaw International Mechanism 
for Loss and Damage to lay down recommendations for an integrated 
approach to address CID/M.116 In September 2018, TFD finalized 
and forwarded the recommendations to the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage.117 Later at COP24, under 
Decision 10/CP.24, recommendations were adopted.118 The key 
recommendations included in the Annex of Decision 10/CP.24 are 
listed below: 
1. Invites parties to enhance understanding on CID/M at both the
internal and cross border levels.119
2. Invites parties to develop relevant laws and policies to address
displacement caused by the adverse impacts of climate change,
taking into consideration respective human rights of the
displaced populations.120
112 Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 23, at 2. 
113 Id. at 12. 
114 Id. 
115 NDC Registry (Interim), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON  
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3, 2019), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/28112019%20Concept%20Note%20 
and%20Programme%20TFD%20Side%20Event%20%28FINAL%20DRAFT%29%20upd
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3. Encourages parties to integrate into national planning process
challenges and opportunities related to climate-induced human
mobility.121
4. Invites parties to recognize the need for displaced or migrant
persons while they are in the country of origin, or transit or in
the destination. It also invites parties to facilitate and secure
safe, regular, orderly, and responsible human mobility and
migrations.122
5. Invites parties to enhance support on regional, sub-regional, and
trans-boundary cooperation to address displacement.123
How effective will recommendations made by TFD will be, and to 
what extent it will protect the rights of CID/M, is yet to be seen. 
However, from the above discussion, it is clear that in the climate 
regulatory regime there is neither a defined legal status of CID/M 
migrants nor is there any protection mechanism to secure their rights. 
There is no clarification regarding the rights of CID/M migrants, 
and no commitments and obligations are given to states to protect 
CID/M migrants. Such gaps primarily result from the failure to make a 
strong case for CID/M migrants at the climate negotiations table and 
the lack of agreement from the developed countries’ party side. It is 
noteworthy that, as of 2020, progress on the implementation of these 
recommendations is not yet visible.  
2. Refugee Law: Definitional Barrier
International refugee law under the 1951 Geneva Convention
extends its safeguards solely to refugees, stateless persons, asylum 
seekers, and returnees. However, it was a long debate to consider cross-
border, climate-induced displacement under the category of refugee to 
get legal protection under the 1951 Convention. To be considered a 
refugee, an individual needs to fall under the category set by the 1951 
Convention.124 Under the 1951 Convention, refugee status is narrowly 
confined to those individuals who face “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”125 Under this specific 
definition of the Convention, climate-induced displaced people do not 
qualify to be considered refugees. 
121 Id. at 44. 
122 Id. 
123 Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 104. 
124 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150. 
125 Id. 
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Under the 1951 Convention, the persecutor must either be a person 
from the government or a non-state actor over whom the government 
has no control or is unwilling to control.126 In climate-induced 
displacement, the root cause of population movement may be the 
adverse impact of climate change, and it is difficult to fit the adverse 
impact of climate change into the mold of the persecutor.127 Thus, the 
adverse impacts of climate change (such as rising sea level, loss of land, 
and cyclones) might be life-threatening but cannot be considered 
persecution. On the other hand, it is also very unlikely that the 
government will persecute people who are under the threat of climate 
change.128 Again, to prove an act of persecution, it would be hard to 
prove the causal link between government actions with mens rea 
and climate-induced displacement for such action. Yet again, to be 
considered a refugee the reason for persecution must fall under any five 
grounds mentioned in the definition. However, displacement due to the 
adverse impact of climate change or the environment is not included as 
a reason for persecution. Some scholars argue that climate-induced 
displacement might fall under the category of “membership of a 
particular social group.”129 However, according to the Handbook for 
the 1951 Convention, “particular social group” includes persons of 
similar background, habits, or social status (such as nationality, race, 
and religion), and having membership of such a particular social group 
must be at the root of the fear of persecution.130 Climate-displaced 
people can be considered as having a similar background, but fear of 
persecution for being a climate-induced people is illogical to accept.  
Considering all these grounds, in a recent asylum case Ioane Teitiota 
v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and
Employment, a New Zealand court declared that Teitiota’s plea to be
considered a climate refugee was novel but not convincing.131 The court
held that
126 AF (Kiribati) v Refugee Status Branch (RSB) of the Dep’t of Labour [2013] NZIPT 
800413 at ¶ 54. 
127 Marta Picchi, Climate Change and the Protection of Human Rights: The Issue of 
“Climate Refugees,” 13 US-CHINA L. REV. 576, 577 (2016). 
128 Id. 
129 Jessica B. Cooper, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the 
Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 480, 480 (1998). 
130 Id. 
131 Ioane Teitiota v. Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp. [2015] NZSC 
107.
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The Refugee Convention did not apply to Teitiota and is not well 
suited to protect environmental migrants generally. Relief under the 
Refugee Convention is limited to states with governments that have 
caused, either directly or indirectly, the suffering of a group of people 
on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group. Kiribati and other states 
facing climate change should certainly not aspire to such a draconian 
option for relief.132 
Hence, the judgment made it clear that the definition of refugee 
given in the 1951 Convention does not cover climate-induced 
displacement, and with its narrow application, the Convention cannot 
extend its protection to climate-induced displacement. However, the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee made an observation on this 
judgment upon a complaint filed by Ioane Teitiota in January 2020. 
According to the observation, the judgment did not violate the right to 
life of Ioane Teitiota. However, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee recognized that sudden or slow-onset events could be a 
threat to the right to life for which a person can seek cross-border 
protection, and it can link up with the principle of non-refoulement.133 
This recognition from the United Nations Human Rights Committee is 
significant for future cases. Nevertheless, if an individual crosses the 
border due to fear from persecution, and if he also suffers from the 
adverse impact of climate change, the person can be considered a 
refugee and receive the protections that this recognition entails.134 
The narrow and limited refugee definition given in the 1951 
Convention is the key barrier here for excluding climate-induced 
displacement from legal safeguards under the refugee law. However, 
some have suggested widening the scope of the definition by amending 
it to include climate-induced displacement. Even if there is an 
amendment to the definition, it will not solve the issue, as there is the 
least possibility that climate change displacement will result due to the 
persecution of government or non-state actors. And if an attempt is 
made to change the definition entirely with a wider concept, it would 
give rise to the risk of degrading existing protection measures for 
refugees by opening a wide-ended floodgate.  
132 Id. 
133 Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, 
Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016, U.N. Human Rights Committee CCPR/C 
/127/D/2728/2016 (Jan. 7, 2020), at 9, 15, http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change 
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3. Laws of Statelessness: Incompetent for CID/M
Sea level rise may cause the disappearance of habitable lands or
states in which the entire population may get displaced. Scholars have 
the opinion that international law related to statelessness might extend 
its protection to this type of CID/M even though there are uncertainties 
and complexities about the application of the concept.135 The 1954 
Convention on Stateless Persons considers an individual as a stateless 
person when the person is “not considered as a national by any State 
under the operation of its law.”136 The 1954 Convention protects a 
stateless person from forceful expulsion, provided that they are 
lawfully staying inside the receiving country’s territory.137 The 
Convention is not rights-oriented and in narrow scope recognized the 
exercise of human rights during a stateless person’s stay in the 
receiving country. The Convention encourages states (though in very 
weak language) to reduce the number of stateless persons.138 However, 
the Convention does not recognize the stateless person’s right to cross 
or enter into the territory of other states. It mentions only that the 
receiving state allow reasonable time to a stateless person within which 
the person can seek “legal admission into another country.”139 
In CID/M, the population usually intends to cross a border when 
there is a risk of inundation due to sea level rise. Such movement in no 
way strips their nationality. Therefore, as there are no denials of 
nationality, it is not possible to consider them stateless per the 
definition of the 1954 Convention. Even if a state completely 
disappears due to sea level rise (presuming for small island countries), 
the question may arise as to whether the law related to stateless persons 
will be applicable for these permanently displaced people or not. The 
answer to that question is also debatable, as there is legal uncertainty 
about whether to consider a disappeared state as an extinct state. To be 
considered a state under international law, a country must have a 
government, permanent territory, population, and the capacity to enter 
into a relationship with other states.140 Disappearance of a state gives 
135 Mayer, International Challenges, supra note 57, at 383. 
136 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1(1), Sept. 28, 1954, 360 
U.N.T.S. 117. 
137 Id. at art. 31(1). 
138 Id. at Introductory Note. 
139 Id. at Article 31(3). 
140 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19.
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rise to questions of the existence of these elements. However, 
international law considers a state extinct only when a state splits, 
merges, or is voluntarily absorbed by other states.141 Moreover, 
continuity or extinction of a state also depends on political decisions 
and assessment of other states.142  
The discussion above made it evident that a population displaced 
due to the disappearance of a state cannot be de jure considered 
stateless persons, though de facto they will be stateless for having a 
formal nationality which is not, in practice, effective. Even if de jure 
they are considered as stateless, protection under the 1954 Convention 
will not be very helpful for them because the Convention neither gives 
the right to enter into a foreign territory nor does it address the issue of 
permanent settlement. But, under the Convention, CID/M may allow a 
stateless person to make a claim for naturalization under the notion of 
reduction of statelessness. The narrow scope of the 1954 Convention 
leaves limited scope for the wider interpretation to protect CID/M 
migrants who lost their state due to sea level rise. The protection under 
the Convention may arise only if a state disappears and is formally 
declared extinct, making its nationals legally stateless. However, there 
is no imminent possibility of a state submerging. It is also noteworthy 
that climate change displacement occurs soon after the land becomes 
uninhabitable and it will occur before the state disappears. Therefore, 
effective protection is needed to address the current situation by 
adopting effective laws. 
4. Human Rights Law: Limited Scope for CID/M
The adverse impacts of climate change threaten the enjoyment of
fundamental human rights like the right to life, shelter, water, food, and 
so on. Difficulties in exercising these rights often result in permanent, 
internal or cross-border, displacement or migration. However, human 
rights laws remain tremendously silent in the sole context of climate 
change and cross-border CID/M.143 In the international human rights 
regime, there is neither any binding agreement that discourses cross-
border CID/M nor has any attempt been made for the expansion of 
the regime to include cross-border CID/M.144 The United Nations’ 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement was adopted in 1998 and 
141 James Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 705–14 (2nd 
ed. 2006). 
142 Mayer, International Challenges, supra note 57, at 384. 
143 BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 37, at 320. 
144 Nishimura, supra note 96, at 117. 
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recognizes human rights violations that resulted from natural disasters 
and extends protections for the people displaced due to a natural 
disaster.145 However, the guidelines do not apply to the displaced or 
migrant people who crossed the territorial border of a state.146 To 
address the protection issue of cross-border CID/M, scholars often refer 
to the principles of non-refoulement and responsibility to protect, two 
new emerging principles.147 Therefore, this section of the Article will 
explore the efficiency and scope of these principles to extend protection 
to cross-border CID/M. 
The principle of non-refoulement is a well-known customary 
international law148 adopted in a good number of international 
agreements.149 Though the principle originated from refugee laws, 
human rights laws extend its scope further. The principle of non-
refoulement prohibits states from rejecting, deporting, or returning an 
alien to the country of origin, or the frontiers of the territory, if there is 
a substantial risk of deprivation of life, physical integrity, or liberty, or 
a possibility of being subject to cruel, inhuman treatments or degrading 
punishments or tortures.150 Under the principle, prohibited conduct 
from the state includes “expel[ing],” “return[ing],” “extradit[ing],” and 
“reject[ing].”151 The principle applies to any person and is “not limited 
to those formally recognized as refugees.”152 Rules related to admission 
145 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 40. 
146 Id. at Introduction. 
147 See, e.g., BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 37, at 321; Mostafa Mahmud Naser, 
Climate-Induced Displacement in Bangladesh: Recognition and Protection Under 
International Law, 82 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 487 (2013); Nishimura, supra note 96, at 118. 
148 Nils Coleman, Non-Refoulement Revised Renewed Review of the Status of the 
Principle of Non-Refoulement as Customary International Law, 5 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 
23, 23 (2003). 
149 International instruments that adopted the principle of “non-refoulement” are the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Declaration on Territorial Asylum 
(1967), 1969 OAU Convention on Refugees, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984), 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969), Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966), European Convention on Human Rights (1950), and the 
European Convention on Extradition (1957). Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The 1967 Declaration 
on Territorial Asylum, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2012), https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/dta/dta_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8ZV-D4N5].  
150 Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope & Content of the Principle of 
Non-refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S 
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION ¶¶ 166, 175, 179 (Erika Feller 
et al. eds., 2003). 
151 Id. at 90–92. 
152 Id. at 88. 
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and non-refoulement also apply to large-scale “mass influx” 
situations153 and grant temporary protection.154 
To apply this principle to CID/M, individuals need to establish that 
on return there is a risk of deprivation of the right to life or liberty, or 
the possibility of torture or cruel, inhuman, degrading punishment or 
treatment. As the Article discussed above, the adverse impact of 
climate change imposes a potential threat to absolute rights (i.e., the 
right to life by affecting other fundamental rights like the right to food, 
shelter, health).155 The adverse impact of climate change may also 
severely degrade living conditions by violating the right to food, water, 
health, and housing, which can be linked with degradation/inhuman 
treatment from the wider context.156 Moreover, the adverse impact of 
climate change may cause mass displacement, and the application of 
the non-refoulement principle will be significant here to deal with 
mass-influx situations157 Because even in mass influx, receiving states 
are required to provide admission and temporary protection to the 
displaced people until conditions permit for safe return.158 
However, the difficulties in exercising the right to life and liberty or 
in becoming the subject of cruel punishment or torture must arise from 
an act of the state or anyone acting on behalf of the state. And as 
mentioned in previously, these elements are completely missing in the 
matter of CID/M.159 So, the principle of non-refoulement and its 
application to CID/M is still a gray area, and any claims from CID/M 
under this principle need to be carefully tailored, developed, and argued 
with the ambit of states’ obligations of non-refoulement.160 The 
international community also needs to consider widening the 
applicability of the principle so that cross-border CID/M and gross 
violations of human rights for this cannot remain unaddressed. Though 
it is worth noting that the principle of non-refoulement grants safety 
from expulsion with temporary protection, this cannot solve the 
problem of many CID/M migrants who lost their land permanently and 
need permanent settlement in a country. 
153 Id. at 103–05. 
154 Id. at 144(f). 
155 See supra Part I. 
156 See infra Part III. 
157 Jane McAdam, Climate Change Displacement and International Law: 
Complementary Protection Standards, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 
UNHCR (2011), at 39, 46. 
158 BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 37, at 320. 
159 See infra Part IV. 
160 Id. at 321. 
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For the protection of CID/M migrants and to overcome the legal 
limitations, another avenue that scholars are currently exploring is the 
principle of responsibility to protect.161 According to this new emerging 
principle, 
State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary 
responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. 
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal 
war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question 
is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, that responsibility to protect 
must be borne by the broader community of states.162  
Under this new principle, responsibility to protect specifically includes 
three responsibilities: “responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild.”163 
The text made it clear that the principle does not cover the context 
of climate change nor is it intended to extend protection to CID/M 
migrants. The scope of the principle primarily covers situations like a 
crime against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes 
including military intervention. Human rights violations or threats to 
human security from climate change are not within the ambit of the 
principle.164 However, displacement and harm caused by the adverse 
impact of climate change might be considered “state failure” of 
prevention, where the state is unable to “halt or avert” the situation.165 
Though, in the climate change context, “failure of state” to prevent the 
adverse impact of climate change does not occur from the action or 
inaction from the concerned state but due to the failure of developed 
countries to reduce the emission of GHG into the atmosphere. Still, an 
attempt can be made to link up CID/M with the principle of 
responsibility to protect from a wider perspective. For such an 
expansion of the application of the principle, more legal analysis and 
interpretation is needed. 
However, through the responsibility to protect principle, 
establishing the international community’s duty to protect CID/M will 
161 Susan Martin, Forced Migration, the Refugee Regime and the Responsibility to 
Protect, 2 GLOB. RESP. PROTECT 38, 38 (2010). 
162 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT, at viii (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4SMC-5YV3]. 
163 Id. ¶ 8.28. 
164 About the Responsibility to Protect, Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations 
New York, 1 (Nov. 20–21, 2008), http://archive.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s1.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/97SD-HY5K]. 
165 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 162, at (1)B. 
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give rise to other legal questions and challenges: What will a protection 
obligation entail? Will it entail an obligation to admit cross-border 
CID/M migrants into the territory permanently, or will it be some 
temporary assistance? CID/M requires more permanent and long-term 
solutions, and temporary assistance will not serve much help to the 
cross-border CID/M migrants. Again, if the obligation entails the 
responsibility to admit CID/M, it will be contrary to the sovereign 
rights of a state. The exercise of obligation might be more complicated 
when cross-border CID/M happens between two developing countries, 
like Bangladesh and India, where both countries are suffering from 
similar adverse impacts of climate change and are under the severe 
threat of loss of lands. Moreover, there is also concern about the proper 
application of the principle, as the principle has no legally binding 
effect and application of it might be driven by a state’s political will or 
discretionary power.166 
Under the no harm principle of general international law, the 
responsibility to protect CID/M migrants can be established to get a 
durable and permanent solution to the cross-border CID/M.167 Under 
this customary rule,168 the basis of states’ liability to protect CID/M 
migrants arise from failing to reduce GHG emission in the atmosphere, 
which causes transboundary environmental harm and results in climate 
change with its related adverse effects.169 Breach of no-harm obligation 
entails liability for the responsible state.170 However, under the no-
harm rule, establishing state liability for the climate change context is 
an intricate and contentious issue because of causal uncertainty and 
attribution,171 due diligence strain, multiple wrongdoers, determining 
proportional contribution,172 complexities with joint or several 
liabilities,173 and retrospective liability. However, the uncertainty in 
establishing state liability to protect CID/M migrants under the no harm 
166 BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 37, at 321. 
167 Rina Kuusipalo, Exiled By Emissions—Climate Change Related Displacement and 
Migration in International Law: Gaps in Global Governance and the Role of the UN Climate 
Convention, VT. J. OF ENV’T L. 614, 626 (2017). 
168 Benoît Mayer, The Relevance of the No-Harm Principle to Climate Change Law and 
Politics, 19 Asia Pac. J. Env’t L. 1, 15 (2016) [hereinafter Mayer, No-Harm]. 
169 Id. at 2. 
170 Id. at 15. 
171 Sharaban T. Zaman & M. Hafijul Islam Khan, A Legal Appraisal on Liability 
and Compensation Logic to Address the Impact of Climate Change, in CONSERVATION, 
SUSTAINABILITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN INDIA, 197–98 (Alok Gupta ed., 2020). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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rule is slowly being wiped out with the advancement of science and 
technology to establish a causal link between carbon emission, global 
warming, and the adverse impact of climate change. Moreover, 
scholarly articles174 and groundbreaking judicial decisions like 
the judgment of the Urgenda Foundation v. Government of 
the Netherlands set forth new, innovative, wide, and flexible 
interpretations of the no harm rule to support the climate change 
liability claim.175 
5. Migration Law: Absence of Protection
Crossing international borders and gaining admission into a territory
are imperative issues that closely connect with state sovereignty. 
Therefore, immigration-related rules and regulations mostly depend on 
domestic migration laws, which decide the eligibility criteria for 
migrants hoping to gain admission and permission to reside in that 
territory. These laws also determine the migrant’s legal status, duration 
of stay, employment rights, and other issues. Nevertheless, at the 
international level, to protect cross-border migrants’ rights, some legal 
instruments are adopted. For instance, the Migrant Workers 
Convention was adopted by the United Nation in 1990.176 The 
Convention recognizes an individual as a migrant if the person is 
involved in some remunerated activities in a foreign state irrespective 
of their legal status.177 This wider definition includes a climate-induced 
migrant who is involved in remunerated activities in a foreign state. 
However, the Convention did not provide any rights or protections to 
the migrant to cross the border.178 Similarly, the Migration for 
Employment Convention of 1949179 and the Declaration on the Human 
Rights of Individuals Who are Not Nationals of the Country in Which 
They Live of 1985180 also do not recognize migrants’ rights to cross the 
174 Mayer, No-Harm supra note 168, at 54. 
175 The Hague District Court 24 Juni 2015, 7196 m.nt Rechtbank Den Haag, (Urgenda 
Foundation/ Government of the Netherlands) (Neth.). 
176 G.A. Res. 45/158, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Dec. 18, 1990). 
177 Id. at Article 2(1).  
178 Id. See also Mayer, Governing supra note 32, at 385–86. 
179 Adopted by International Labour Organization Convention on July 1, 1949 (entered 
into force January 22, 1952). 
180 Adopted by United Nations General Assembly on December 13, 1985. G.A. Res. 
40/144, Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the 
Country in Which They Live.  
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border or stay in other territories.181 All these legal instruments in 
reality address some fundamental human rights for migrants who are in 
a specific circumstance, and these circumstances do not include 
migrations due to climate factors. Also, all these legal instruments are 
ratified by very few states, which indicates a lack of political will to 
protect and recognize economic migrants’ human rights.182 
International migration law does not provide adequate protection to the 
migrants from where climate migrants can invoke some support. 
B. Legal Gaps in Regional Legal Protection Mechanisms
of South Asia 
Due to sociopolitical instability, internal conflicts, war, and 
environmental factors, South Asia as a region has historically 
witnessed considerable intraregional displacement and human 
movement.183 Historically, it is evident that countries in this region not 
only generate refugees, migrants, or displaced populations (like 
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh) but also host them (like 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal). The region witnessed the largest 
intraregional human displacement and population movement in 1947, 
during the time of the India-Pakistan Partition; in 1970, when the 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan War broke out; in 1971, when 
Bangladesh fought for its independence; and recently due to climate 
change.184 Though the region experienced huge human displacement 
and population movement over time, courtiers in South Asia have yet 
to develop any regional legal protection mechanisms for human 
displacement and population movement. In South Asia, the sole 
regional organization is the South Asian Association of Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC).185 Unfortunately, neither through SAARC nor 
bilaterally has an attempt been made by SAARC countries to extend 
legal protection to the displaced or migrant population. 
However, SAARC, as a regional intergovernmental organization, 
adopted some declarations and action plans to address the climate 
change issues. Some examples are the Comprehensive Framework on 
181 Mayer, No-Harm supra note 168, at 54. 
182 DIMITRA MANOU ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 150 
(Andrew Baldwin, Dug Cubie & Anja Mih eds., 1st ed. 2017). 
183 JOLLY & AHMAD, supra note 39, at 149. 
184 Id. at 125. 
185 About SAARC, SAARC (July 12, 2020), https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/about 
-saarc/about-saarc [https://perma.cc/TG8E-3LC4]. Established in 1985 as a regional inter-
governmental organization. Id.
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Disaster Management 2006;186 the Dhaka Declaration 2008 and 
SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change 2009-11;187 and the Thimphu 
Statement on Climate Change 2010.188 In 2016, SAARC also 
established the SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC) to 
provide policy advice and support related to capacity building. SDMC 
also adopted strategic roadmaps on disaster management issues. 
Though these documents invite countries to strengthen regional 
collaboration to address climate change problems, displacement and 
population movement are neither featured nor addressed in any of these 
documents. In the last SAARC summit (held in 2014, at Kathmandu), 
civil societies urged SAARC countries to adopt a SAARC Charter to 
provide CID/M with rights to free movement within the SAARC 
region.189 However, the 2014 Kathmandu Declaration addressed the 
“safety, security, and wellbeing of their migrant workers,”190 but issues 
related to CID/M remain absent due to lack of strong political will and 
financial resources.191 
It is worth noting that SAARC, as a regional organization, is 
politically and structurally weak. It has limited capacity to deal with 
the contentious issue. Under Article X of the SAARC Charter, it is set 
forth that “[d]ecisions at all levels shall be taken based on unanimity. 
Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the 
deliberations.”192 So far, refugees and climate-induced displacement 
remain contentious issues within SAARC countries. Therefore, 
186 UNDRR, SAARC Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management, 
PREVENTION WEB (2007), https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=60968 
&rid=4 [https://perma.cc/E77A-GHWX]. 
187 The SAARC Declarations on Climate Change, South Asian Ass’n Reg’l Coop., 
http://www.equitybd.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/The-SAARC-Declarations-on 
-Climate-Change.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TAU-VQYU] (last visited July 17, 2019).
188 Press Release, Thimphu Statement on Climate Change, Sixteenth SAARC Summit
Thimphu (Apr. 29, 2010), http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/3808_30th-april-2012
-bil.pdf.
189 SAARC States Urged to Allow Free Movement of Climate Refugees, THE DAILY 
OBSERVER (Nov. 11, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.observerbd.com/2014/11/16/55032.php
[https://perma.cc/4FWT-9UZ8].
190 Kathmandu Declaration, South Asian Ass’n Reg’l Coop., Nov. 26–27, 2014, 21,
http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/24375_EIGHTEENTH_SUMMIT
_DECLARATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB6T-29UU].
191 Zahid Shahab Ahmed, The Role of SAARC and EU in Managing Refugees in South
Asia and Beyond: Potential for North-South Cooperation, 9 GLOB. POL’Y 76, 80 (2018).
192 Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, South Asian Ass’n
Reg’l Coop., https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/about-saarc/saarc-charter [https://perma
.cc/4D9K-TQ9G] .
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references of these are entirely missing from all documents adopted 
from 1985 to date.193 Among SAARC countries, it is only Bangladesh 
and Maldives who are expressing firm footing to recognize and protect 
CID/M. The rest of the States so far remain silent. 
However, cross-border CID/M is an unavoidable reality in the South 
Asia region. Therefore, to strengthen and deepen mutual negotiations 
and dialogue between countries on the issue of cross-border mass 
CID/M, it is urgently required to formulate regional treaties, policies, 
or mechanisms. Such a step is extremely vital to address the rights of 
the cross-border displaced or migrant population and to develop 
cooperative mechanisms for regional peace and security issues. 
C. Legal Gaps in National Protection Mechanisms and Practices in
the South Asian States
Though all South Asian countries are very active in the United
Nations climate negotiation process and are duly executing their 
international legal obligations under different climate governance-
related legal instruments, none of the states afford effective national-
level legal protection to CID/M migrants. Many states in South Asia 
clearly acknowledge cross-border CID/M and its related threat to 
human rights, national and regional peace, and security issues in 
national-level policy documents.194 However, the national-level 
legal and policy responses toward cross-border CID/M are entirely 
missing. Equally, safeguards toward internal CID/M are significantly 
inadequate and at the embryonic stage. 
Table 1 on the following pages briefly highlights the existing legal 
mechanisms and practices in South Asian states in the matter of cross-
border CID/M.195  
Table 1 shows that in South Asian countries there are no specific 
laws that refer to or address cross-border CID/M. Contrary to the 
significance of CID/M, the Maldives, which is under the persistent 
threat of disappearance due to sea levels rising, also made no reference 
to CID/M in any of its legislation. However, the Disaster Management 
Act, 2012 of Bangladesh in section 2(11)(f) refers to loss and damage. 
Under the loss and damage section, displacement and migration can be 
considered. However, the Act 2012 made no direct reference to CID/M. 
193 Zahid Shahab Ahmed, Managing the Refugee Crises in South Asia: The Role of 
SAARC, 28 ASIAN & PAC. MIGRATION J. 210, 215 (2019). 
194 JOLLY & AHMAD, supra note 39, at 35–36. 
195 This table was exclusively developed by the author based on field research, expert 
consultation, and survey. 
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• No legislation that specifically addresses/refers to CID/M.
• The National Adaptation Programs of Action of 2009; the
National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons, 2013 refers 
to internal displacement. 
• Under Article 7 of the Afghanistan Constitution, migrants get
human rights protection. 
• Migrants, in general, are regulated under the Citizenship Act,







• The Disaster Management Act 2012 addresses displacement
from a wider context.
• The National Adaptation Programs of Action of 2005 with an
update in 2009; Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and
Action Plan of 2009; Seventh Five Year Plan (2016-2020);
Perspective Plan (2010-21) address internal displacement and
migration from the perspective of adaptation.
• Articles 31 and 32 of the Bangladesh Constitution grant
human rights protection to each and all persons irrespective
of citizenship.
• Migrants and refugees, in general, are regulated under The
Passport Act, 1920; Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939;






• No legislation that specifically addresses/refers to CID/M.
• No policies that specifically address/refer to CID/M. (For
example, the Bhutan National Adaptation Plan of Action did 
not refer to CID/M.) 
• Article 7 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan
grants human rights protection to all persons. 
• Migrants, in general, are regulated under the Citizenship Act
of 1985; Immigration Act, 2007; Immigration Rules and 
Regulation, 2012. 




• No legislation that specifically addresses/refers to CID/M.
• Kerala and Assam State Action Plans on Climate Change
(SAPCCs); The National Disaster Management Plan
(NDMP) refers to internal displacement and migration.
• Part III of the Indian Constitution grants human rights
protection to all persons irrespective of citizenship.
• Migrants, in general, are regulated under Passport Act, 1920;
Foreigner Registration Act, 1939; Foreigners Act of 1946;






• No legislation that specifically addresses/refers to CID/M.
• National Adaptation Plan of Action; Climate Change Policy
Framework (MCCPF) refers to climate refugees. 
• Migrants, in general, are regulated under the Immigration
Act, 2007; Crossing Border By Air Act 2019; Crossing 





• No legislation that specifically addresses/refers to CID/M.
• National Adaptation Programmes of Action; Climate Change
Policy (2011) refers to internal climate-induced 
displacement. 
• Migrants, in general, are regulated under the Immigration
Act, 1992 and The Immigration Rules, 1994; Non-Resident 






• Pakistan Climate Change Act, 2017, did not refer to CID/M.
• No policies that specifically address/refer to CID/M.
• Article 9 of the Pakistan Constitution grants protection to all
persons. 
• Migrants, in general, are regulated under the Pakistan
Citizenship Act, 1951 and the Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 





 • No legislation that specifically addresses/refers to CID/M.
• National Adaptation Plan (2016-2025); Post Disaster
Recovery Plan (May 2017) referred to internal displacement. 
• Migrants, in general, are regulated under the Immigrants and
Emigrants Act and Regulation 1956; Citizenship Act No. 18 
of 1948. 
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In South Asia, Pakistan is the only country that has a specific law on 
climate change, named the Climate Change Act, 2017. Though the 
country is receiving cross-border CID/M, especially from Afghanistan, 
the Act did not refer to CID/M.196 
Some countries refer to internal displacement in their policies (like 
Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, Maldives, and Sri Lanka), but 
reference to cross-border movement is entirely missing in these 
relevant policy frameworks. Countries that mention CID/M mostly 
refer to it from the perspective of adaptation strategies (like 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh) and condition rehabilitation and relocation 
of CID/M on the availability of financial and technical resources. Sri 
Lanka refers to internal displacement as a socioeconomic outcome due 
to the adverse impact of climate change. Human rights and protection 
measures for CID/M are also entirely missing in these countries’ 
legislative frameworks. The issue of cross-border CID/M has yet to be 
included in the mainstream legal and policy frameworks of South Asia. 
However, South Asian countries address cross-border CID/M 
through general immigration and citizenship laws instead of through 
laws specifically targeting CID/M. Considering the sovereignty and 
national security issues, states usually prefer to hold absolute and 
unrestricted power in the matter of granting citizenship, residence, or 
entry permits and in controlling the borders. Consequently, permission 
to cross the border requires strict compliance with immigration laws, 
and the state holds the absolute authority to prevent, refuse, or cancel 
the entry. In the matter of long-term or permanent stay, foreigners 
usually get permission under the economic category,197 family 
category,198 or humanitarian199 category.200 The immigration laws 
required for the economic, family, and humanitarian categories are 
usually very strict, and due to the lack of specific definition and 
legal status, in practice, CID/M has yet to be considered under a 
humanitarian ground. 
196 JOLLY & AHMAD, supra note 39, at 125. 
197 Where skill and qualification requirements need to be fulfilled. Rafael Leal-Arcas, 
Climate Migrants: Legal Options, 37 PROCEDIA – SOC. & BEHAV. SCIS. 86, 92 (2012). 
198 Where one of the family members already received citizenship in the destination 
country. Id. 
199 Where person needs to prove humanitarian grounds like war, armed conflict, threat 
for persecution. Id.  
200 Id. 
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In some countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
India), cross-border migrants or displaced populations may seek human 
rights protections under the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. India, through its judicial decisions, reinforces these 
protection measures toward foreigners and aliens. For example, in 
Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, the Indian Supreme Court was 
directed to secure life and personal liberty of each and all persons 
including foreigners and aliens under Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution.201 In Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, it was held that 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is broad and includes a number of 
rights like the right to live with dignity, right to livelihood, right to 
shelter, right to protection, and the right to social security.202 In 
National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, the 
court held that the state is bound to provide protection to secure Article 
21 and such protection shall be for every human, including 
foreigners.203 Under this judicial decision, CID/M in India might seek 
legal protection in the matter of right to life and personal liberty. 
However, in the National Human Rights Commission v. State of 
Arunachal Pradesh case the Indian Supreme Court also held that 
foreign nationals do not have any guaranteed fundamental right to 
receive Indian citizenship.204 Through this judicial decision, the Indian 
Government got absolute power to refuse citizenship or cancel 
residence of foreigners and to expel them at any time.  
At the national level, cross-border CID/M is considered an issue of 
prominence. However, legislative responses and protection measures 
toward cross-border CID/M are inadequate in all South Asian 
countries, causing gross human right violations and increasing tension 
in regional peace and security. 
D. Barriers to Developing Protection Mechanisms for CID/M
The existing legal and policy gaps at the international, regional, and
national levels make it evident that though CID/M is a major concern, 
no nation-state has made it an obligation yet. Why have no mechanisms 
201 Louis De Raedt v. Union of India with B.E. Getter v. Union of India and S.G. Getter 
v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 554, ¶ 13 (India), https://www.refworld.org/cases,IND_SC
,3f4b8ce54.html [https://perma.cc/9LC4-VGB6].
202 Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621, 671, 694, 725 (India). 
203 National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (1996) SCC (1) 
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have been developed under each or any of these regimes to secure 
protection for CID/M migrants? What are the barriers hindering the 
development to frame protection mechanisms for CID/M migrants? 
Understanding those obstacles is necessary to initiate the framing of an 
effective protection mechanism. 
Throughout the last decade, several options have been proposed 
to address the protection gaps of CID/M.205 Some options include 
adopting a new protocol or framework, setting a new definitional 
standard for CID/M, or expending the scope of an existing 
treaty/convention to include CID/M.206 However, none of these 
proposals were sustained at the negotiation table and the vacuum 
continues today. This legal vacuum is attributed to several decisive 
obstacles. From this Article’s aforesaid discussion, it can be contended 
that the international legal regime’s major obstacles are as follows: 
1. Lack of an agreed definition on CID/M which can segregate
CID/M from other categories of displacement and
migration. Such lack of definition hinders not only the
development of protection mechanisms but also the
development of a dedicated institution focusing only on
CID/M.
2. Narrow and limited scope of relevant international laws (like
international human rights law, migration law, or laws
related to statelessness) and lack of consensus to extend the
scope of these laws. These barriers in international law have
spillover effects at the national and regional levels.207
However, at the national level, the key barriers that came out from 
this chapter’s aforesaid discussion are 
1. national security concerns and intent to hold absolute
sovereign power;
2. the tendency to consider cross-border climate-induced
populace movement as an issue of adaptation strategy
instead of considering it a failure of adaptation, which
eventually simplifies the issue and gives scope to
sidestep a state’s accountability toward those vulnerable
communities; and
3. the lack of financial and technical resources.
205 Nishimura, supra note 96, at 118. 
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Apart from these, the lack of strict liability under the climate 
regulatory regime also hinders the development of a protection 
mechanism for CID/M. “Under strict liability, an actor is liable for any 
harm he causes, even if he is not at fault.”208 Some argue that strict 
liability is derived from the principles of “responsibility and corrective 
justice.”209 Strict liability gives a legal basis to the victim for claiming 
compensation. The absence of strict liability in the climate regime 
paved the way for polluter countries to evade their causal responsibility 
toward climate migrants and displaced populations. And failure to 
establish such strict climate liability is due to the lack of a causal link 
between GHG emissions and climate-induced calamities that displaced 
the population (clear link of harm suffered by the plaintiff resulted from 
defendant’s action).210 There is also debate about the calculation of time 
which gives rise to the argument that establishing strict climate liability 
will be a retrospective rule.211 However, the argument is not rational 
because from 1990 to date, emitter countries have known that excessive 
GHG emissions cause climate change. With this in mind, they continue 
their high emission use. This has been the case for almost for three 
decades.212 
However, the primary barrier in the development of the protection 
mechanism for CID/M is the lack of political consensus and resistance 
from states at the global, regional, and national levels to create a new 
governing regime. Lack of political consensus stems from several 
decisive factors—like recognizing cross-border CID/M and developing 
protection measures for them. Conducting such actions will impose 
new obligations on states to welcome and assist a new category of the 
migrant and displaced population. States are reluctant to take this 
burden because the burden will be prolonged and will require an outlay 
of significant financial and technical resources.213 Polluter countries 
express such reluctance by taking the benefit of not having any strict 
208 DAVID WEISBACH, HARVARD PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
AGREEMENTS, NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE 30 (July 2010). 
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liability. On the other hand, developing countries’ (like in South Asia) 
bases of reluctance are uncertain reception of states’ gains or 
insignificant economic incentives214 with prolonged liabilities and 
expenditures.215 All these problems ultimately discourage developing 
countries from taking an additional burden, as they have no historical 
responsibility for GHG emissions and are themselves perplexed with 
climate change and other socioeconomic problems like poverty, 
overpopulation, and land shortage.216 Moreover, eighty-five percent of 
the world’s displaced populations are currently hosted by developing 
countries.217 
The legacy of the governing regime of refugee law also has a 
spillover effect in this political unwillingness.218 Unless states sign the 
Refugee Convention of 1951, under customary international law it is 
hard to strictly enforce the customary principle of non-refoulement.219 
The obligation to accept refugees is mostly exercised voluntarily. In the 
matter of cross-border CID/M, states also want to see it as a voluntary 
obligation. Also, the principle of non-refoulement has yet to apply to 
the mass population displacement triggered by natural calamities.220 
Moreover, under the Refugee Convention of 1951, host states not only 
have a responsibility to receive refugees and secure a safe stay but they 
are also overburdened with the obligation to find a durable solution for 
the refugees in the third country or at the country of origin. This 
complex burden under the refugee laws discourages the development 
of a new legal protection framework for CID/M. Burdened countries 
might need to receive thousands or millions of migrants/displaced 
populations, and this number has alarmingly increased over the years.  
Therefore, a clear, sustainable legal framework is needed as a 
tenable solution for cross-border CID/M. This solution can effectively 
overcome all aforesaid realities, and burdened countries can get support 
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from the majority of the states. CID/M is a unique global challenge that 
needs to be discussed efficiently. 
The Nanseen Initiative is a 2012, state-led consultative initiative that 
seeks to build consensus on cross-border CID/M.221 The goal of this 
initiative is to establish a consensus among states on “the protection 
agenda”222 of CID/M. The Nanseen Initiative’s protection agenda 
stands on the three pillars of (a) building international cooperation and 
solidarity, (b) developing standards for the treatment of CID/M, and 
(c) developing an operational response.223 Under the protection agenda,
its phases are (1) preparedness before displacement, (2) displacement
time assistance and protection, and (3) post displacement solution for
the transition.224 However, the initiative is in a very preliminary stage
and the process has no plan to develop new legal standards or laws.
Nonetheless, it believes that building consensus through this process
might result in new soft or hard laws.225
IV 
REMEDYING THE EXISTING REGIONAL PROTECTION GAP 
IN SOUTH ASIA 
Scant attention of international law, state actors’ lack of willingness, 
persistent denial of recognition, and restrictive attitude to protect 
CID/M are all roadblocks to conceiving an effective legal protection 
mechanism for cross-border CID/M.226 Considering the situation, the 
key question is what is the best pragmatic step toward eliminating the 
normative gap and securing protection for cross-border CID/M? 
According to McAdam, the existing protection gap related to 
cross-border CID/M cannot be resolved by international law or by 
adopting an international treaty.227 Because climate change will 
affect each region differently, the result is different patterns of 
population movement and displacement.228 Therefore, it would be 
nearly impossible for a single global treaty to accommodate all the 
221 The Nansen Initiative, About Us, https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/ (last 
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incompatible interests of original and host countries along with 
addressing diverse population movements under each region’s varied 
contexts. Moreover, there are difficulties in segregating cross-border 
CID/M as discussed in Part II. Even negotiation for such a global treaty 
would be extremely intricate229 as there is a lack of political will.230 
Extending the scope of other international regulatory regimes that are 
developed to guard another category of people will not help either to 
address the special and diverse needs of CID/M.231 Considering all 
these reasons, for South Asia, a regional protection mechanism might 
provide a better platform than relying on international laws. However, 
in South Asia, as cross-border migration altogether remains a 
contentious issue due to the number of national-level barriers, adopting 
a nonbinding legal framework might be an effective opening step 
instead of directly pushing for a legally binding regional agreement. 
The benefit of a nonbinding legal framework is that it can 
accommodate flexibility while determining state obligations and 
standards of actions. It can also lead toward the adoption of a legally 
binding treaty by establishing opinio juris through state practice,232 or 
it can be a supportive and guiding tool to help state actors in dealing 
with cross-border CID/M.233 It can also be a viable option to address 
specific, particular attuned needs of South Asia, its countries, and 
CID/M.234 Considering all these, this section will explore a potential 
regional protection framework for the cross-border CID/M in South 
Asia. 
A. Framing a Potential Protection Framework:
Key Issues to Consider 
The nonbinding legal framework needs to be crafted cautiously with 
ample empirical understanding and foresight235 to avoid the adoption 
of an oversimplified and vague legal framework, which cannot be 
translated practically or adapted to make a real difference while being 
229 Id. at 176. 
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implemented.236 Caution also needs to be taken while architecting state 
obligation to avoid imposing inequitable, irrational, or impractical 
obligations on the state. The flexibility and discretion of states while 
complying with obligations also need to balance so that flexibility and 
discretion cannot make cross-border CID/M sufficiently unprotected. 
Therefore, while architecting rational normative frameworks it is 
important to understand—specifically in the category of cross-border 
CID/M—the patterns of movement and displacement, outline the 
current and future needs of people who already cross the border due to 
climate change, comprehend the patterns of human rights violations in 
different stages of migration or displacement journeys, and analyze the 
threat and growing tension to regional peace and security related with 
cross-border CID/M. While drafting the normative frameworks, it is 
also important to recognize that some people may not be able to move 
due to poverty and other social factors (these can be referred to as 
trapped populations). Attention must be paid to this group when 
designing a legal framework. 
In the normative protection framework, the key actors will be the 
country of origin and the host country. The participation of the 
international community is also essential here. Therefore, while 
crafting a nonbinding legal framework for South Asia it is important to 
give much attention to a number of critical factors like the following: 
• in existing global, regional, and national laws there is a clear gap
in recognizing, protecting, and facilitating resettlement of cross-
border CID/M;
• “responsibility to protect” cannot be applied here. Historically,
South Asian states have had no contribution to the global climate
change problem. Rather, they are most vulnerable due to the
adverse impacts of climate change. Therefore, a responsibility-
based normative framework will not be a viable option here;
• South Asian states have limited capacity to assist or protect
cross-border CID/M and to grant permanent protection to
them, as countries are overburdened with multiple complex
socioeconomic and climate change-related problems; and
• it is also particularly important to keep in mind the coexistence
of two converse facts: the cross-border CID/M phenomenon and
the dearth of political will to protect them.
These aforementioned key factors also give rise to a number of 
indispensable questions that need to be answered critically if we truly 
want to capture the majority of South Asian states’ consensus to open 
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the border for cross-border CID/M and to implement the framework 
effectively. Here the key critical questions are as follows: 
• What would be the possible nature of the protection framework?
Will it be solely rights-based or will it accommodate other
factors?
• Considering the limited capacity of the South Asian countries for
cross-border CID/M, what would be the degree of protection?
• How to capture the state’s consensus to adopt and implement the
nonbinding legal framework? In other words, how to make a
country agree to act under the framework?
To protect the rights of cross-border CID/M, there is strong advocacy 
to adopt a rights-based approach, as the approach upholds humanitarian 
and human rights discourses.237 To move and live with dignity, it 
is undoubtedly essential to protect cross-border CID/M rights through 
a human-rights-centric manner. According to the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee, the aim of the protection mechanism should 
“[e]ncompass[] all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the 
rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of 
the relevant bodies of law (i.e. HR law, IHL, refugee law).”238 
However, the rights-based approach calls for actions from a wider 
perspective of morality and ethics, rather than asserting it from a 
technical and legal sense.239 Moral or ethical grounds alone fail to 
persuade receiving states to renounce partial sovereign rights to open 
the border240 and to take extra burdens by granting protection to the 
cross-border CID/M. Therefore, moral and ethical grounds under a 
rights-based approach need to trade off with some firm technical and 
legal grounds that can induce states to agree to act. This eventually 
triggers the third question. 
The security-based approach can help in this regard. Cross-border 
CID/M triggers potential threats in internal, transborder, or regional 
peace and security.241 Massive illegal migration may result in internal 
instability; exacerbate human, drug, or arms trafficking; increase piracy 
237 Mayer, Governing, supra note 32, at 35. 
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or terrorism; or contribute to the security threats in other ways. 
According to Benoît Mayer, a state’s willingness to avoid all these 
peace and security threats can be a driving force or reason to induce a 
state to act242 in the matter of cross-border CID/M. Therefore, while 
framing the nonbinding protection framework, human rights, 
humanitarian concerns, and fairness need to integrate and reconcile 
with peace and security incentives in an utmost realistic and 
comprehensible way. This can convince South Asian states to adopt 
and implement the agreed-upon norms. Through cooperation, burden 
sharing, and capacity-related support, greater incentives should also be 
granted to host states so that they do not feel overburdened and can act 
efficiently to protect cross-border CID/M. 
However, the integration of a rights-based approach in the protection 
framework triggers the second complex issue related to the degree of 
protection and the limited capacity of host states. According to refugee 
law, the term protection includes the adoption and implementation of 
all activities that are needed to secure refugees’ rights.243 Such actions 
mostly encompass assistance efforts244 such as admission into the 
country of destination, protection against expulsion (application of 
non-refoulement), nondiscrimination, accessing basic human rights in 
host countries to lead a dignified life, and most importantly, finding a 
durable solution through the return into the country of origin, 
reintegration in the host country, or resettlement in the third country. 
Scholars suggest adopting an inclusive interpretation of the term 
protection to cover diverse patterns of climate-induced migration and 
displacement and to accommodate different needs based on varied 
vulnerabilities.245 However, according to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, the duty to protect the refugee/displaced population 
primarily rests upon the host country.246 International protection is 
complementary to the protection afforded by a host country.247 
According to Sadruddin A. Khan, “International protection can only 
function as a supplement to the protection arising from the internal 
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institutions of the host country.”248 Undoubtedly it is a huge 
responsibility and prolonged burden for a host state that has limited 
resources and capacity and is already perplexed with other 
socioeconomic problems. Therefore, considering the resource and 
capacity constraints, in framing the protection framework it is also 
critically necessary to decide up to what extent would South Asian 
states be obliged to grant protections. Will it be temporary protection 
until the displaced population gets a durable solution elsewhere, or 
more about permanent settlement? 
Considering the socioeconomic context, resource constraints, and 
the land crisis of South Asian states, it would not be rational or justified 
to oblige the host state to grant permanent protection and settlement 
within its territory. Furthermore, South Asian states have zero 
contribution to the global climate change problem. Therefore, 
temporary protection status until the displaced population gets a 
durable solution elsewhere might be a more viable option here. 
Typically, under humanitarian and human rights grounds, such 
temporary protection status is given with ad hoc basis assistance.249 
Such an approach has already been adopted in many national laws (like 
in the United States Immigration and Nationality Act (1952), Finland 
Aliens Act (2004), Sweden Aliens Act (2005)) to grant protection toward 
disaster-induced, cross-border displaced persons.250 A similar approach 
was also adopted in the European Union Directive 2011/95/EU251 for 
the cross-border displaced population who needs protection. 
Compared to permanent protection status, temporary protection 
status is undeniably weaker, as it does not provide, first and foremost, 
strict duty on the state to protect the displaced population. As such, 
many scholars consider it as an insufficient measure, and as incapable 
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of providing a sustainable solution.252 However, instead of living with 
the protection gaps and until inventing a sustainable option, adoption 
of such temporary protection status can be an adequate option,253 and 
provides a good opening for cross-border CID/M migrants to get 
admission and humanitarian assistance in the host state and to find a 
durable solution. Such a flexible approach gives leeway to the host state 
to determine the admission and protection issues on a case-by-case 
basis, and such discretion may induce South Asian states to open their 
borders. It is worth noting that the aforementioned legislation usually 
grants temporary protection status for sudden onset events to deal with 
mass influx. However, to protect cross-border CID/M migrants, 
temporary protection status should be granted for slow onset events as 
well. 
Regarding a durable solution for cross-border CID/M migrants, a 
return to the country of origin in many cases will not be an option if the 
land becomes permanently uninhabitable. Reintegration in the host 
country would be difficult in South Asia, as all states are overpopulated 
and have an acute land crisis.254 Therefore, resettlement in a third 
country can be an option for a durable solution and lobbying with the 
third country should not be considered solely as the duty of a host state. 
The country of origin should also actively cooperate to persuade this. 
While framing the nonbinding protection framework for South Asia, 
provisions for support and funding from the international community 
(more specifically from developed countries) should also be adequately 
integrated, because climate change is a human-caused phenomenon 
resultant from excessive GHG emissions by developed countries.255 
With zero contribution to this problem, developing and least-
developing countries unfairly bear climate change burdens, along with 
other socioeconomic problems. It is also clear that developing countries 
(including those in South Asia) cannot cope with a large influx of 
cross-border CID/M migrants.256 Therefore, considering the converse 
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connection between contributions and impacts,257 the major GHG-
emitting countries should bear a share of the burden258 to protect the 
rights of the CID/M migrants, considering the principles of equity, 
justice,259 fairness, cooperation, and common but differentiated 
responsibility, and to comply with the obligation under the climate- and 
human-rights regulatory regime.260 To share the burden with major 
emitter countries, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility can play a significant role, as it is one of the key guiding 
principles of the UNFCCC.261 This key principle can assist in 
architecting how the burden-sharing process should be articulated. For 
example, how will major emitter countries assist the cross-border 
CID/M migrants? By receiving them, by providing technical or 
financial assistance, or by adopting any other means?  
Being the sole regional institute, SAARC can be the possible 
implementing agency of this nonbinding protection framework. 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, SAARC has already 
adopted some of the declarations related to climate change. Adoption 
of a protection framework would be an important forward step to 
address the vulnerability of the CID/M migrants and to secure their 
rights. It is also vital to develop multiagency strategies in the protection 
framework to complement and support each other.262 
Therefore, besides SAARC and state actors, organizations like 
UNFCCC, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), United Nations 
Women, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and other 
civil societies’ involvement should be integrated to build multi-
stakeholder partnerships so that they can come forward to facilitate the 
implementation of the framework. Since the key focus of the protection 
framework should be to guard the needs and rights of the cross-border 
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CID/M, the distribution of well-defined institutional responsibilities263 
is also vital and should be guided by the principle of human rights. 
While shaping responsibility for SAARC, state actors, and other 
organizations, it is also essential to determine boundaries of acceptable 
conduct264 and set limits for exercising discretion and flexibility, so that 
human-rights-focused responses measure can be effectively 
implemented. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion made it evident that—though cross- 
border CID/M is a dreadful phenomenon in South Asia—substantial 
normative gaps and denial of protection at an international, regional, 
and national level cause gross human right violations, increase 
humanitarian crises, heighten tension in regional peace and security, 
and persistently increase the risk of violent conflict. The normative 
gaps and denials of acknowledging obligations of protection for the 
cross border CID/M is the by-product of definitional shortcomings; 
categorical complexity; conceptual disagreement; the narrow scope of 
relevant international laws; lack of political will to recognize CID/M 
and to create a new governing regime; lack of strict liability in climate 
governing regimes; considering cross-border CID/M as an issue of 
adaptation strategy instead of failure of adaptation; the inclination to 
hold absolute sovereign power within the territory; restrictive attitudes 
toward protecting CID/M migrants; the spilling effect of refugee-
governing regimes; the complex regimes; the lack of financial and 
technical resources; other socioeconomic problems of South Asian 
states; and so on.  
But it is also undeniable that due to the hardest hit of climate change 
in South Asia, cross-border CID/M is a reality and state actors cannot 
deny, avoid, or sidestep this dire crisis. If the habitual home becomes 
uninhabitable and the right to life comes under existential threats with 
no alternative quality options, to save their lives, people are obliged to 
move. 
Therefore, considering all barriers and challenges, along with the 
note that at the international level little hope is left to adopt a protection 
mechanism for cross-border CID/M, the Article suggests adopting a 
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nonbinding legal framework in South Asia. Though adoption of a 
nonbinding legal framework with temporary protection status might 
not be as strong as a strict legally binding permanent protection 
measure, it can be a pragmatic opening step toward eliminating the 
normative gaps for cross-border CID/M in South Asia. 
However, larger participation and consensus of South Asian states 
to act under the legal framework to protect cross-border CID/M 
migrants depends entirely on how well the framework will be 
articulated realistically with a fine balance among adequacy and degree 
of human rights-based protection measure; integration of security-
based approach within the rights-based approach; incorporation of 
flexibility and greater incentive for host states; distribution of balanced 
and feasible obligation among the host state, state of origin and 
developed countries to find a durable solution; integration of support 
and cooperation from an external source and international community; 
determining boundaries of acceptable conduct; and setting limits 
of exercising discretion and flexibility. SAARC can take the lead in 
implementing the framework along with the support of other 
international and intergovernmental institutions. The normative 
frameworks should also set forth specific mechanisms for populations 
who got trapped due to poverty and other social factors. 
To conduct this colossal work, South Asian state heads can also 
consider conducting comprehensive research work before framing the 
protection framework or before starting regional negotiations to assess, 
analyze, and understand each aforementioned issue. In this whole 
process, it is necessary to bear in mind that cross-border CID/M is not 
a mechanism for adjustment, but the last resort of survival which needs 
to be governed intensely with the tools of human rights, equity, justice, 
and fairness. The urgency to protect cross-border CID/M migrants is 
fierce and we must now agree to act with collective endeavor and 
integrity. 
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